Harming Future Persons - Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem

Acknowledgements

Contents

Contributors

Harming Future Persons: Introduction

1 Purpose of this Collection

2 The Person-Affecting Intuition and the Nonidentity Problem

3 The Nonidentity Cases

4 Three Strategies for Addressing the Nonidentity Problem

5 Contributions to this Collection

6 Conclusion

Notes

References

Part I

The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem

1.1 The Logical and Metaphysical Dimensions of the Problem

1.2 Four Strategies for Responding to the Nonidentity Problem

1.3 Numerical, Biographical and Autobiographical Identity

1.4 Conclusion

Notes

References

Part II

Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives

2.1 The Asymmetry, Common Sense Morality and Rights

2.2 How the Doctrine of Negative Rights Explains the Asymmetry

2.3 The Grounds and Groundlessness of Rights

2.4 The Symmetry of Reasons of Beneficence

Notes

References

Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Definitions and Distinctions

3.3 Reasons and Values Presupposed by the Asymmetry

3.4 The Distinction Between Harming and Benefiting

3.5 The Individual-Affecting Symmetry View

3.6 The Antinatalist Symmetry View

3.7 The Impersonal Symmetry View

3.8 Conclusion

Notes

References

Part III

Who Cares About Identity?

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The Moral Insignificance of Transworld Identity

4.3 The Prudential Insignificance of Transworld Identity

4.4 Genes and Identity

Notes

References

Do Future Persons Presently Have Alternate Possible Identities?

5.1 The Erewhon Hypothesis

5.2 Variations on a Theme by Parfit

5.3 The No-Difference Thesis

5.4 Identity-Determining Choices and Identity-Determining Characteristics

5.5 Ambiguous “Identities”

5.6 Vague “Identities”

5.7 Alternative Conceptions of “Identity”

5.8 Future Persons as Vague but Identifiable Objects of Present Obligations

5.9 Parfit and “The Descriptive View”

5.10 Return to Erewhon

Notes

References

Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Two Decisive Intuitions

6.3 How Simple Consequentialism Fails

6.4 Why Simple Consequentialism Fails

6.5 Rule Consequentialism

6.6 A Contingent Morality

6.7 Rule Consequentialism and Moral Philosophy

Notes

References

Part IV

Harming as Causing Harm

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Harming as Causing Harm

7.3 Solving the Non-identity Problem

7.4 Harming and Benefiting Those Who Independently Exist

7.5 Is Causing Harm Sufficient for Harming?

7.6 Conclusion

Notes

References

Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions

8.1 Introduction

8.2 How Bad Is It?

8.3 The Philosophical Problem

8.4 Preventing Births to Protect Children

8.5 The Nonexistence Condition

8.6 The Human Rights Approach

8.7 The Non-Identity Problem

8.8 Conclusion

Notes

References

Other References

Harming and Procreating

9.1

9.2

9.3

9.4

9.5

9.6

9.7

9.8

9.9

9.10

Notes

References

The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem: When is One Act Better for a Person than Another?

10.1 Parallel Problems

10.2 A Person-Based Approach to Procreative Choice

10.3 The Nonidentity Problem

10.4 The Two-Envelope Problem

10.5 Conclusion

Notes

References

Part V

Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-identity Problem

11.1 The Liberal View of Reproduction

11.2 Reproduction and Non-identity

11.3 Reproduction and Partiality

11.4 The Case Against Impartiality

11.5 The Case Against Partiality

11.6 A Pessimistic Conclusion?

Notes

References

Two Varieties of “Better-For” Judgements

12.1 The Principle of Procreative Beneficence

12.2 PPB and the Non-Identity Problem

12.3 Internal and External Perspective “Better-For” Judgements

12.4 Prospective Parenthood and the Internal Perspective

12.5 Principled Procreation

12.6 Summary

Notes

References

Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions

13.1 Introduction

13.2 Must We Create the Best? Partiality Toward Future Imperfect People

13.3 Justifying Harm in Different-Number Cases: The Generation-Adding Policy

13.4 Justifying Harm in Same-Number Cases: The Chauvinist Policy

13.5 An Impersonal Explanation of the Chauvinist Policy

13.6 Limits on the Role of Procreative Intentions in Justifying Harm

13.7 An Alterative? Asymmetrical Responsibility for Harms and Benefits

13.8 The Limitations of Asymmetrical Responsibility

13.9 Selectivity, Partiality, and Procreative Intentions

13.10 Conclusion

Notes

References

Part VI

Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?

14.1 Introduction

14.2 Comparativism

14.3 The Person Affecting Restriction

14.4 Strict Comparativism

14.5 Asymmetrical Comparativism

14.6 Inconsistency

14.7 Personal Good Restriction Regained

14.8 A Normative Version of the Restriction

14.9 Soft Comparativism

14.10 Dominated Outcomes

14.11 Future Populations and Trade Offs

14.11 Summary

Notes

References

Part VII

Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regulation of Reproductive Liberty

15.1 Fundamental Liberties

15.2 Types of Harm to Future Children

15.3 Compelling State Interests

15.4 Two Different Distinctions

15.5 Future Children, Whoever They May Be

15.6 Will the Courts Agree?

Notes

References

Reparations for U.S. Slavery and Justice Over Time

Notes

References

Name Index

Subject Index