Causation, Coherence and Concepts - A Collection of Essays

Preface

Contents

Introduction

Belief

Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Simple Conditional Functions

1.3 A Problem with Simple Conditional Functions

1.4 Ordinal Conditional Functions

1.5 Conditionalization and Generalized Conditionalization

1.6 Independence and Conditional Independence

1.7 Connections with Probability Theory

1.8 Discussion

Causation

Direct and Indirect Causes

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The Conceptual and Formal Framework

2.3 Direct Causes

2.4 The Circumstances of Direct Causes

2.5 The Difficulties with Indirect Causation

2.6 Causation

Causation: An Alternative

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Variables, Propositions, Time

3.3 Induction First

3.4 Causation

3.5 Redundant Causation

3.6 Objectivization

Bayesian Nets Are All There Is to Causal Dependence

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Causal Graphs and Bayesian Nets

4.3 About the Causal Import of Bayesian Nets

4.4 Actions and Interventions

Causal Laws are Objectifications of Inductive Schemes

5.1 Is Causation Objective?

5.2 Induction

5.3 Causation

5.4 An Explication of Objectification

5.5 The Objectification of Induction and Causation

5.6 Outlook

Laws

Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief

6.1 Preparations

6.2 Ranking Functions

6.3 Laws

6.4 Other Things Being Equal, Normal, or Absent

6.5 On the Confirmation of Laws

6.6 Some Comparative Remarks

Enumerative Induction and Lawlikeness

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Ranking Functions

7.3 Symmetry and Non-negative Instantial Relevance

7.4 Laws

7.5 Laws and Enumerative Induction

7.6 The Apriority of Lawfulness

Chance and Necessity: From Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Chance-Credence Principles

8.3 The Admissibility of Historic and Chance Information

8.4 The Admissibility of Chance Information and Humean Supervenience

8.5 Humean Supervenience

8.6 Projection Turns the Principal Principle into a Special Case of the Reflection Principle

8.7 Humean Projection

8.8 Appendix on Ranking Functions and Deterministic Laws: The Same All Over Again

Coherence

A Reason for Explanation: Explanations Provide Stable Reasons

9.1 Introduction

9.2 Induction and Causation

9.3 Causation and Explanation

9.4 Reason and Truth

9.5 Explanations and Stable Reasons

Two Coherence Principles

10.1 Introduction

10.2 Reasons

10.3 Two Coherence Principles

10.4 Justifying the Coherence Principles via Enumerative Induction?

10.5 Justifying the Coherence Principles via the Essence of Propositions?

10.6 Justifying the Coherence Principles via Consciousness?

10.7 Justifying the Coherence Principles via a Theory of Perception

How to Understand the Foundations of Empirical Belief in a Coherentist Way

11.1 Introduction

11.2 Belief, Belief Change, Reasons, and Apriority

11.3 Dispositions and Reduction Sentences

11.4 A Thesis Concerning the Basis of Empirical Beliefs

11.5 Defending the Thesis

11.6 The Foundationalist’s Last Resort?

Concepts

A Priori Reasons: A Fresh Look at Disposition Predicates

12.1 Introduction

12.2 Beliefs and Reasons

12.3 Kant, Kripke, Kaplan and Beliefs A Priori

12.4 Disposition Predicates and Reduction Sentences

12.5 Normal Conditions and A Priori Reasons

12.6 The Categorical Base of a Disposition

12.7 Outlook

The Character of Color Terms: A Materialist View

Concepts Are Beliefs About Essences

14.1 Introduction

14.2 The Problems Specified

14.3 How to Define Concepts: A Proposal

14.4 Explanations

14.5 Individualism Rescued?

Changing Concepts

The Intentional Versus the Propositional Structure of Contents

16.1 The Thesis

16.2 Stage Setting

16.3 The Dialectical Background of the Thesis

16.4 Two Arguments for the Thesis and an Objection

16.5 The Method of Sufficiently Fine-Grained Descriptions

16.6 Some Afterthoughts

Bibliography

Name Index

Subject Index