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Creating R&D Incentives for Medicines for Neglected Diseases - An Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports, Patents, and Alternative Mechanisms to Stimulate Pharmaceutical Research
Foreword
7
Acknowledgments
9
Summary Contents
11
Detailed Contents
12
List of Abbreviations
15
List of Figures and Tables
17
1. Introduction
18
1.1. The Malaria Case
21
2. The TRIPS Agreement and Access to Patented Medicines
24
2.1. Introduction
24
2.2. Standards
26
2.3. Enforcement of IPRs under the TRIPS Agreement
37
2.4. Dispute Settlement
41
3. Economic Analysis of Patents
45
3.1. Introduction
45
3.2. Underlying Economic Theory
46
4. Patent Protection in the Developing World: Theory and Evidence
115
4.1. Introduction
115
4.2. Microeconomic Theory as to Patent Protection in the Developing World
116
4.3. Empirical Evidence regarding Patent Protection in the Developing World
147
5. Legal and Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports
157
5.1. Introduction
157
5.2. Parallel Trade and the Pricing of Pharmaceutical Products in a Double Marginalization Game
158
5.3. Parallel Trade of Pharmaceutical Products in the Context of National Price Regulation
206
5.4. Parallel Trade and the Availability of Patented Pharmaceutical Products in the Developing World
213
6. Solutions for the Problem of Underinvestment in R&D for Medicines for Neglected Infectious and Tropical Diseases
217
6.1. Introduction
217
6.2. Insufficient Market Size and Low Expected Market Returns to Research
218
6.3. Push Programs and R&D for Neglected Infectious Diseases
221
6.4. Pull Programs and R&D for Neglected Infectious Diseases
228
6.5. Parallel Trade and Medicines for Neglected Infectious Diseases
244
6.6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
245
7. Conclusion and Ideas for Further Research
248
Appendix
251
Bibliography
265
Index
298
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