The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law - Volume I: Cash Flow, Risk, Agency, Information

von: Petri Mäntysaari

Springer-Verlag, 2009

ISBN: 9783642027505 , 484 Seiten

Format: PDF, OL

Kopierschutz: DRM

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The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law - Volume I: Cash Flow, Risk, Agency, Information


 

Table of Contents

5

1 Introduction

9

1.1 What Does Corporate Finance Law Mean?

9

1.2 Why Was This Book Written?

10

1.3 What Are the Themes of This Book?

11

1.4 General Principles and the Firm

16

2 The Nature of Corporate Finance Law

18

2.1 Introduction

18

2.2 Key Objectives of Corporate Finance Law

18

2.3 Corporate Finance Law and Efficiency

24

2.4 Comparison with Other Fields of Law

25

2.5 Key Tools and Practices in Corporate Finance Law

28

3 Management of Cash Flow: General Remarks

29

3.1 The Scope of Legal Considerations

29

3.2 Generic Ways to Manage Cash Flow

30

4 Management of Risk: General Remarks

35

4.1 Introduction

35

4.2 Legal Risk

37

4.2.1 Introduction

37

4.2.2 Different Categories of Legal Risk

38

4.2.3 The Effect of the EU on Legal Risk

40

4.2.4 Excursion: Directly Applicable Community Law

47

4.3 Management of Legal Risk

52

4.3.1 Introduction

52

4.3.2 Strategic Level

54

4.3.3 Operational Level

55

4.3.4 Transactional Level

68

4.4 Management of Risk by Legal Means

73

4.4.1 Introduction

73

4.4.2 Living with Risk

74

4.4.3 Transfer of Risk Through Incorporation

77

4.4.4 Community Law, Incorporation, Governing Law

88

4.4.5 Transfer of Risk Through Contracts

98

4.4.6 Mitigation of Risk Through Diversification

100

5 Agency, Risk, Transparency, Governance

102

5.1 Corporate Risk Management v Corporate Governance

102

5.2 Partly the Same Legal Tools

102

6 Management of Agency in General

104

6.1 Introduction

104

6.2 Behaviour Modification

106

6.3 Choice of the Scope of Agency

110

6.4 Alignment of Interests

111

6.5 Monitoring (Transparency)

114

6.6 Choice of Agents

114

6.7 Rules and Standards

115

6.8 Initiation and Ratification

116

6.9 Trusteeship and Reward

117

6.10 The Role of Legal Background Rules

118

7 Corporate Risk Management

120

7.1 Introduction

120

7.1.1 General Remarks

120

7.1.2 Financial Theory, Strategy, and the Firm

120

7.1.3 Corporate Risk Management as a Business Discipline

121

7.1.4 Costs, Risk Level, Compliance, Agency, Information

123

7.2 Strategic Risk Management

125

7.3 Operational Risk Management

128

7.4 Fundamental Organisational Measures

130

7.5 Excursion: Dealings with Third Parties

138

7.6 The Regulation of Corporate Risk Management

140

7.6.1 Introduction

140

7.6.2 Basel II and Ratings

141

7.6.3 Fair Value Accounting of Financial Assets

144

7.6.4 Basel II and the Governance of Banks

147

7.6.5 The MiFID and Risk Management

148

7.6.6 Disclosure of Risk

151

7.6.7 The Contents of Risk Management Policies

158

8 Agency and Corporate Governance

163

8.1 Introduction

163

8.2 Three-level Choices, Theory of Corporate Governance

169

8.2.1 General Remarks

169

8.2.2 First Level, Artificial Person

170

8.2.3 First Level, Organisation

171

8.2.4 First Level, Legal Organisation v Real Organisation

172

8.2.5 Second Level, the Firm as the Principal

173

8.2.6 Third Level, the Interests of the Firm

176

8.3 The Function of the Board

178

8.4 Particular Remarks: Extreme Cases

183

8.5 The Function of Stakeholders

187

8.6 Allocation of Value and Risk

188

8.7 The Role of Shareholders

189

8.7.1 The Interests of Shareholders

189

8.7.2 The Function of Shareholders

192

8.7.3 The Relative Importance of Shareholders

197

8.7.4 Should the Share Price Be Maximised?

199

8.7.5 What Does Making a Profit for Shareholders Mean?

200

8.7.6 What Are Shareholders Paid For?

201

8.7.7 How Can the Board Increase the Value of Shares?

203

8.7.8 Why Should the Firm Use Takeover Defences?

205

8.7.9 Why Are Shareholders Protected by Laws?

206

8.7.10 Should Shareholders Have Formal Powers?

208

9 Management of Agency in Corporate Governance

212

9.1 Introduction

212

9.2 Dealing with Different Agents: General Remarks

213

9.2.1 Agent Mix

213

9.2.2 Industries as Agents

214

9.2.3 The Firm as an Agent

215

9.2.4 Society at Large as an Agent

216

9.2.5 Shareholders as a Class as Agents

217

9.2.6 Individual Shareholders as Agents

220

9.2.7 Banks and Other Lenders as Agents

223

9.2.8 Customers and the Public as Agents

225

9.2.9 Managers as a Class as Agents

226

9.2.10 Individual Managers as Agents

237

9.2.11 The Board as an Agent

239

9.3 Community Law

244

9.3.1 Introduction

244

9.3.2 Separation of Decision Management and Control

247

9.3.3 Monitoring by the Board

252

9.3.4 Financial Reporting and Transparency

255

9.3.5 The Alignment of Interests, Financial Rewards

270

9.4 Controlling Shareholders’ Corporate Governance Tools

275

9.4.1 Introduction

275

9.4.2 Block-holding as a Corporate Governance Tool

276

9.4.3 The Board as a Corporate Governance Tool

292

9.5 Minority Shareholders’ Corporate Governance Tools

306

9.5.1 Introduction

306

9.5.2 Avoidance of Risk

308

9.5.3 Mitigation of Risk in Advance

308

9.5.4 Equivalent Treatment

311

9.5.5 Block-holding as a Corporate Governance Tool

312

9.5.6 Different Classes of Shares

320

9.5.7 Voting Caps

325

9.5.8 Exit Rights

325

9.6 “Good Corporate Governance” as a Tool

329

9.7 Outsourcing as a Corporate Governance Tool

332

10 Management of Information

337

10.1 Introduction

337

10.1.1 General Remarks

337

10.1.2 Information and Information Economics

338

10.1.3 Dealing with Information Problems

341

10.1.4 The Role of Legal Rules on Information

346

10.1.5 Corporate Finance Law, Information, the Firm

348

10.2 Information Management in Corporate Finance Law

350

10.2.1 Introduction

350

10.2.2 Information Delivery Chain

350

10.2.3 Legal Tools and Practices: General Remarks

354

10.3 Legal Tools and Practices: Investment in Information

354

10.3.1 General Remarks

354

10.3.2 Automation, Standardisation

355

10.3.3 Separate Decisions, Contracts

355

10.4 Legal Tools and Practices: Incoming Information

357

10.4.1 Introduction

357

10.4.2 Transfer of Risk

358

10.4.3 Intermediaries, Improving Information Quality

358

10.4.4 Creating Incentives

361

10.4.5 Screening of Potential Intermediaries

363

10.4.6 Identifying Good Intermediaries

365

10.4.7 Identifying Bad Incentives

368

10.4.8 Being Optimally Informed

370

10.4.9 Mitigating the Risk of Attribution of Information

372

10.5 Legal Tools and Practices: Outgoing Information

375

10.5.1 Introduction

375

10.5.2 Keeping Information Secret

376

10.5.3 Benefiting from Superior Information

393

10.5.4 Increasing the Perceived Usefulness of Information

397

10.5.5 Management of Reputation

403

10.5.6 Establishing or Restricting Communication

406

10.6 Analysis of Rights and Duties Relating to Disclosure

416

10.7 Community Law

417

10.7.1 Introduction

417

10.7.2 Main Policy Choices

418

10.7.3 Regulation of the Quality of Financial Information

427

10.7.4 Regulation of Intermediaries: General Remarks

440

10.7.5 Information Analysts Outside the Target

441

10.7.6 Information Analysts Inside the Target

456

10.7.7 Information Analysts Inside the Firm

467

10.7.8 Regulation of Outgoing Information Otherwise

468

References

472