Creating R&D Incentives for Medicines for Neglected Diseases - An Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports, Patents, and Alternative Mechanisms to Stimulate Pharmaceutical Research

Foreword

Acknowledgments

Summary Contents

Detailed Contents

List of Abbreviations

List of Figures and Tables

1. Introduction

1.1. The Malaria Case

2. The TRIPS Agreement and Access to Patented Medicines

2.1. Introduction

2.2. Standards

2.3. Enforcement of IPRs under the TRIPS Agreement

2.4. Dispute Settlement

3. Economic Analysis of Patents

3.1. Introduction

3.2. Underlying Economic Theory

4. Patent Protection in the Developing World: Theory and Evidence

4.1. Introduction

4.2. Microeconomic Theory as to Patent Protection in the Developing World

4.3. Empirical Evidence regarding Patent Protection in the Developing World

5. Legal and Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports

5.1. Introduction

5.2. Parallel Trade and the Pricing of Pharmaceutical Products in a Double Marginalization Game

5.3. Parallel Trade of Pharmaceutical Products in the Context of National Price Regulation

5.4. Parallel Trade and the Availability of Patented Pharmaceutical Products in the Developing World

6. Solutions for the Problem of Underinvestment in R&D for Medicines for Neglected Infectious and Tropical Diseases

6.1. Introduction

6.2. Insufficient Market Size and Low Expected Market Returns to Research

6.3. Push Programs and R&D for Neglected Infectious Diseases

6.4. Pull Programs and R&D for Neglected Infectious Diseases

6.5. Parallel Trade and Medicines for Neglected Infectious Diseases

6.6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

7. Conclusion and Ideas for Further Research

Appendix

Bibliography

Index